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PIECING TOGETHER PRECEDENT: FRAGMENTED
DECISIONS FROM THE WASHINGTON STATE
SUPREME COURT
Rachael Clark*
Abstract: For decades, countless jurisdictions have grappled with the ambiguous
precedential weight of court decisions that lack a majority opinion. In American
jurisprudence, applying a “majority,” “lead,” “concurrence,” or “dissent” label to an
appellate court opinion indicates agreement or disagreement with the judgment of the case.
When a decision is fragmented (that is, there is no majority opinion), courts often express the
judgment of the court with one opinion labeled as the “plurality” or “lead” opinion.
Traditionally, labeling an opinion as a “lead opinion” indicates that the reasoning expressed
within the opinion has more support than the other opinions written for the court. In some
jurisdictions, a lead opinion may also carry greater precedential value than its accompanying
opinions.
In Washington state, the precedent set by fragmented court opinions is complex and often
misunderstood. When the Washington State Supreme Court issues fragmented decisions, it
labels one opinion as the lead opinion that expresses the judgment of the court. But labeling
this opinion as a “lead” opinion is misleading: these opinions frequently fail to garner a
plurality of support and may have less precedential value than their accompanying
concurrences and dissents. This practice has led to considerable confusion among those
looking for precedential value within the Court’s fragmented decisions. If the lead opinion
has less precedential value than an accompanying concurrence or dissent, why is it labeled as
the lead opinion? And if not in the lead opinion, where do we find precedential value within a
fragmented decision?
Labeling an opinion as a lead opinion misleadingly indicates greater precedential value
than the opinion may actually warrant. This mislabeling is the result of a clash between the
Court’s method for deriving precedential value from its fragmented decisions and its
procedure for labeling its opinions. When deriving precedential value from its fragmented
decisions, any point of reasoning that receives the assent of five justices—regardless of
whether they concur or dissent in the judgment—is binding on a lower court. At the same
time, the Court’s rules for designating an opinion as the “lead” ignore the reasoning within
that opinion. The focus is only on the judgment. If a majority of the justices agrees in the
judgment with the justice that created a prehearing report on the case, that justice writes a
majority opinion and circulates it to the rest of the Court. After circulation, if the opinion
fails to garner a majority of the court’s support, the Court labels it as a lead opinion. The
main issue is this: the lead opinion retains that label even when a concurrence garners more
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signatures. In sum, the label that an opinion bears provides almost no useful information
other than whether the justice agreed in the judgment.
This Comment argues that the Court should alleviate the confusion surrounding
fragmented decisions with one simple solution: the Court should label its opinions in parts. If
the Court fragments after the initial majority opinion circulates, the lead, concurring, and
dissenting opinions should be broken down into separately labeled parts. Each justice should
sign every part of each opinion that they agree with. The Court should then, if necessary,
reassign the lead opinion label to the opinion garnering the most signatures that concurs in
the judgment.

INTRODUCTION
When an appellate court issues a decision that does not have
unanimous support, each separately writing justice indicates whether
they agree on the judgment, or in other words, whether they agree with
the court’s decision to uphold or overturn the lower court’s ruling. How
the court labels each opinion (as a majority, lead, concurrence, or
dissent) indicates whether the writing justice agrees or disagrees on the
judgment.1 That label also indicates the opinion’s precedential value and
whether it is binding on a lower court: majority opinions have high
precedential value, while dissenting opinions usually have no
precedential value at all.
What an opinion label indicates regarding both the judgment and its
precedential value is especially important in fragmented decisions. This
Comment uses the term “fragmented decision” to refer to any decision
that lacks a clear majority opinion. For example, a fragmented decision
might have a plurality (4–3–2), two pluralities (4–1–4), or even a more
splintered result (1–1–3–3–1).2 Courts use different labels within their
fragmented decisions to indicate whether an opinion agrees in the
judgment and has greater precedential value. Generally, the opinion that
agrees in the judgment and garners the most support bears a label
indicating that it is the “plurality” or “lead” opinion.3 If that court also
1. See Michael I. Meyerson, The Irrational Supreme Court, 84 NEB. L. REV. 895, 899 (2005)
(noting that each U.S. Supreme Court “opinion reflects the results of two different votes,” one
regarding the judgment and the other “on the opinion explaining the reasoning that supports the
judgment.”).
2. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (referring to a “fragmented Court”);
Richard Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 1944 (2019) (using the term
“fragmented decision”).
3. See, e.g., Faulder v. Texas, 612 S.W. 2d 512, 516 n.3 (Tex. App. 1980) (Roberts, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“By custom ‘plurality’ [] refers to the opinion on the prevailing side
which has the most support.”); GEORGE E. DIX & JOHN M. SCHMOLESKY, 40 TEX. PRAC., CRIMINAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.8 (3d ed. 2019) (“[In a fragmented decision from the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, t]he opinion that is reprinted first in the Southwestern Reporter generally
announces the disposition of the case—reversal, affirmance, or some other procedural outcome—
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affords precedential value to fragmented decisions, generally that lead
opinion has greater precedential value than any accompanying
concurrences or dissents.
Almost 10% of the Washington State Supreme Court’s 2018
decisions were fragmented.4 Despite lacking a clear majority opinion,
Washington courts still afford precedential value to parts of these
fragmented decisions.5 Actually determining what precedential value
these decisions have, however, is a complicated endeavor.6 The result is
that many misinterpret how these cases will apply to a lower court.7
Many misinterpret these cases because of the way that the Court
labels its fragmented decisions. While the Court labels one opinion as
the lead opinion in its fragmented decisions, this label is misleading: the
lead opinion does not always garner a plurality of the justices’ votes,
might not express the actual outcome of the case, and might not include
any of the reasoning that the court used to arrive at the judgment. If a
lead opinion has no precedential value, why is it the lead opinion? And if
not in the lead opinion, where can we find precedential value?
Lead opinions often do not have precedential value because of a clash
between the Court’s method for extracting precedential holdings from its
decisions and its procedure for denoting the precedential value of its
that a majority of the judges has agreed upon. Under the practice of the United States Supreme
Court, this opinion would be characterized as one ‘of the Court’ if—but only if—it was joined by a
majority of the members of the court.”). Many scholars use lead opinion and “plurality opinion”
somewhat interchangeably. See, e.g., Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court
Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756, 756 n.1 (1980) (“This Note uses the term ‘plurality
opinion’ or ‘the plurality’ to refer to the opinion designated as the lead opinion of the Court, which
is not always the opinion subscribed to by the largest number of Justices. Other opinions that join
the judgment are designated as ‘concurrences,’ even if they receive more votes than the lead
opinion.”).
4. Of the 104 slip opinions issued by the Court in 2018, 10 were fragmented decisions. See
Available Slip Opinions for 2018, WASH. CTS., https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/index.cfm?fa=
opinions.byYear&fileYear=2018&crtLevel=S&pubStatus=PUB
[https://perma.cc/2Q87-PPG8]
(including links to ten fragmented cases: El Centro de la Raza v. State, 192 Wash. 2d 103, 428 P.3d
1143 (2018); Eyman v. Wyman, 191 Wash. 2d 581, 424 P.3d 1183 (2018); In re Dependency of
E.H., 191 Wash. 2d 872, 427 P.3d 587 (2018); In re Pers. Restraint of Schley, 191 Wash. 2d 278,
421 P.3d 951 (2018); In re Pers. Restraint of Fero, 190 Wash. 2d 1, 409 P.3d 214 (2018); Roake v.
Delman, 189 Wash. 2d 775, 408 P.3d 658 (2018); Schnitzer W. LLC v. City of Puyallup, 190 Wash.
2d 568, 416 P.3d 1172 (2018); State v. Jefferson, 192 Wash. 2d 225, 429 P.3d 467 (2018); State v.
Sassen Van Elsloo, 191 Wash. 2d 798, 425 P.3d 807 (2018); State v. Schierman, 192 Wash. 2d 577,
438 P.3d 1063 (2018)).
5. See, e.g., Wright v. Terrell (Wright II), 162 Wash. 2d 192, 195–96, 170 P.3d 570 (2007)
(piecing together precedent from a fragmented case’s concurrence and dissent).
6. See infra Part II (demonstrating confusion within the legal community regarding the
precedential value of lead opinions issued by the Washington State Supreme Court).
7. See id.
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opinions. The Court extracts precedential value from a fragmented
decision when there is any single point of reasoning that at least five
justices agree with, regardless of whether they concur or dissent in the
judgment.8 But the Court’s procedure for denoting the precedential value
of its opinions does not actually take precedential value into account.9
Instead, the Court denotes the precedential value of its opinions based on
the judgment of the case.10
If the justice who was assigned to prepare a pre-hearing report on the
case is in the majority when the justices vote on the judgment, the Court
assigns the task of writing the majority opinion to that justice.11 This
process for assigning the majority opinion ignores the reasoning behind
each vote. If the justices disagree with the reasoning in the majority
opinion, they frequently split off to write separate concurrences.12 After
splitting off to write separate opinions, if the number of justices signing
on to the majority opinion is fewer than five, the Court relabels the
majority opinion as the lead opinion.13 That lead opinion frequently does
not have a plurality of the justices’ signatures and has little precedential
value.14 Until the Court fixes the clash between its method for extracting
precedent and its procedure for denoting precedential value, the public
must take the same approach as one would when reading seriatim15
decisions: it will have to piece together precedent from all of the
opinions without any guidance.16
City of Shoreline v. McLemore17 illustrates the clash between the
8. See Wright II, 162 Wash. 2d at 195–96, 170 P.3d at 571.
9. See infra notes 156–157 and accompanying discussion.
10. See infra note 157 and accompanying discussion.
11. See infra notes 120–122 and accompanying discussion.
12. See supra note 1 and accompanying discussion; infra notes 159–164 and accompanying
discussion.
13. The Court’s rules do not mention this practice, but the Court regularly does it. See INTERNAL PROCEDURES
MANUAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT (2019) [hereinafter INTERNAL PROCEDURES
MANUAL], available at https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20Documents/
SupremeCourtInternalRules.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZS8Z-TSJS].
14. See infra sections II.A.2, II.A.3.
15. In opposition to the modern practice of courts summarizing their agreement in an opinion of
the court or a majority opinion, when courts used to issue seriatim opinions, each justice wrote a
separate opinion.
16. See Re, supra note 2, at 2004. Re notes that deriving precedent from several opinions is
“somewhat inefficient insofar as it requires interpreters to pore over multiple opinions rather than
one” and that this is an “important reason why the Supreme Court stopped issuing seriatim decisions
in favor of majority opinions.” Id. at 2004 n.331.
17. City of Shoreline v. McLemore, 193 Wash. 2d 225, 438 P.3d 1161 (2019), appeal docketed,
No.19-202 (U.S. Aug. 16, 2019).
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Court’s method for extracting precedential holdings and its procedure
for denoting precedential value of opinions. In McLemore, the lower
court upheld McLemore’s conviction for willfully obstructing police
officers from their duties.18 The Court issued a 4–4 decision, with one
opinion marked as the lead opinion and one marked as a dissent.19
Usually in a 4–4 decision, the ruling of the lower court stands.20 But in
this case the lead opinion purported to overturn the lower court’s ruling,
“hold[ing]” that because the city had not supported its case with
sufficient evidence it must remand to the lower court.21 Immediately
after the release of the slip opinion, a flurry of contradictory
interpretations ensued. McLemore’s counsel asserted that his client
won.22 The Court’s spokesperson implied that the conviction stood23—
regardless of what the lead opinion said. Press headlines noted the
confusion: “Washington Supreme Court baffles lawyers with split
opinion.”24
The next day, the Court issued a correction, but instead of switching
how the court denoted the precedential value of the opinions, it kept the
lead and dissenting opinions’ designations the same. 25 The Court
amended the lead opinion to state that they “would hold” rather than
“hold” and that they “recognize this opinion has garnered only four
signatures,” so the judgment of the lower court was affirmed.26 Even
though the Court labeled one opinion in McLemore as the lead
opinion—which implied some greater precedential value—that opinion

18. McLemore, 193 Wash. 2d at 229, 438 P.3d at 1163.
19. Justice Madsen did not participate in this decision or have a pro-tempore replacement.
20. See, e.g., McIntyre v. State of Wash. Dep’t of Health, Med. Disciplinary Bd., 133 Wash. 2d
859, 860, 949 P.2d 347, 347 (1997) (mem.) (“One of the Justices of this court having recused, this
case was argued to the remaining eight Justices. These eight Justices are divided in their opinions,
and there is no majority for either affirmance or reversal as required by Const. art. IV, § 2.
Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals . . . is affirmed.”).
21. City of Shoreline v. McLemore, No. 95707-0, slip op. at 17 (Wash. Apr 18, 2019) (lead
opinion), amended by Order Amending Opinion, No. 95707-0 (Wash. Apr. 19, 2019).
22. Gene Johnson (@GeneAPSeattle), TWITTER (Apr. 18, 2019, 11:17 AM),
https://twitter.com/GeneAPseattle/status/1118941600992751616 [https://perma.cc/E7UE-3QDH].
23. Id.
24. Gene Johnson, Washington Supreme Court Baffles Lawyers with Split Opinion, Q13 FOX
(Apr. 18, 2019, 7:14 PM), https://q13fox.com/2019/04/18/washington-supreme-court-baffleslawyers-with-split-opinion/ [https://perma.cc/7M3Y-FL2J].
25. Order Amending Opinion, No. 95707-0, McLemore v. City of Shoreline, 193 Wash. 2d 225,
438 P.3d 1161 (Wash. Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/957070.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RHK6-JW65].
26. Id.
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had no precedential value at all.27
The real question following the Court’s correction to the McLemore
decision is why the Court designated the lead opinion as the lead in the
first place. While the Court will not confirm whether the author of the
lead opinion in McLemore was also the justice who reported on the
case,28 the Court’s internal procedures favor assigning the lead
designation to that justice.
This Comment proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the three
factors that make these fragmented decisions so confusing: the Court’s
method of extracting precedential value from its decisions, its procedure
for denoting the precedential value of the opinions, and the justices’
reluctance to join their colleagues’ opinions. Part II discusses some of
the most confusing fragmented decisions and provides examples of how
these cases have been misinterpreted. Part III provides recommendations
to alleviate the confusion: updating the Court’s internal procedures to
complement its method of precedent formation and labeling the opinions
in parts.
I.

THREE FACTORS CONTRIBUTE TO THE CONFUSION

Three interacting practices of the Court combine to create confusion:
its method for extracting precedential value from fragmented decisions,
its procedure for denoting the precedential value of opinions, and the
justices’ reluctance to join their colleagues’ opinions.
A.

The First Factor: How the Court Pieces Together Precedent from
Fragmented Decisions

The first factor contributing to the confusion is the Court’s method for
deriving precedent from its fragmented decisions. This section discusses
how the Court arrived at this method of precedent formation; it also
identifies complexities of the method that are important for
understanding how this method clashes with the court’s internal
procedures for designating the precedential value of opinions.

27. Federal courts of appeals handle 4–4 split decisions by issuing per curiam opinions, and
unlike the Washington State Supreme Court, allow separate dissents. See United States v. Holmes,
537 F.2d 227, 227–28 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (“[The lower court’s holdings] are [] affirmed by
an equally divided court.”); id. at 228 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting); INTERNAL PROCEDURES
MANUAL, supra note 13, at II-8 (“Per curiam opinions will be unanimous and will not include
separate dissents or concurrences.”).
28. E-mail from Wendy Ferrell, Assoc. Dir. of the Admin. Office of the Courts, to author (May 6,
2019, 12:50 PM) (on file with author).
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Marks v. United States: A Federal Precedent with Multiple
Interpretations

When piecing together precedent from fragmented decisions, the
Washington State Supreme Court ascribes precedential value to any
point of reasoning that receives the assent of five justices, regardless of
whether they concur or dissent in the judgment. This practice has its
roots in federal precedent.29
In traditional American jurisprudence, fragmented decisions held no
precedential value other than in their result.30 Few took issue with this
practice because prior to 1938 the United States Supreme Court rarely
ever issued fragmented decisions.31 After the Court began to issue
fragmented decisions more frequently in the 1940s, some started to
argue that these decisions could have precedential value.32 During this
time, a split developed in the lower federal courts: some held that
fragmented decisions had value only in their results, others held that the
plurality opinion had precedential value, and the rest “looked for a
logical connection or implicit agreement between the plurality and
concurring opinions.”33 In 1977, the United States Supreme Court
attempted to resolve this split in Marks v. United States.34
In Marks, the United States Supreme Court held that “[w]hen a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds.’”35 But the seemingly simple
solution advanced by the Marks rule is illusory: no one can agree on
how to determine what the “narrowest grounds” are.36 Lower federal
29. See infra section II.A.1.
30. See HENRY C. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS 135–36 (1912);
EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES § 48 n.1 (2d ed. 1894) (“If . . . less than a majority
concur in a rule, no one will claim that it has the force of the authority of the court.”).
31. Mark A. Thurmon, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of
Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419, 420 (1992) (“[T]he Supreme Court rendered
fewer than twenty no-clear-majority decisions before 1938.”).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
35. Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
36. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (noting that Marks has “baffled and
divided the lower courts that have considered it” (quoting Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738,
745–46 (1994))). For a thorough explanation of the different interpretations of the Marks rule, see
Re, supra note 2, and Ryan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential
Constraint, 69 STAN. L. REV. 795 (2017).
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courts have interpreted and applied the Marks rule in vastly different
ways, but the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to
provide a clear standard.37
One major debate among those interpreting the Marks rule is whether
cross-judgment majorities (where assertions within dissents contribute to
the “narrowest grounds”) are permissible.38 Courts that approve of this
interpretation, including the Washington State Supreme Court, afford
weight to any “specific proposition[]” that the majority of the justices in
any of the opinions have “explicitly or implicitly” agreed upon.39 This is
called the “all opinions approach.”40 Many argue that this approach is
technically a departure from the Marks rule, because Marks states that
the narrowest grounds of agreement among “those [justices] who
concurred in the judgments” may contribute to precedent.41
One positive aspect of this approach is that it allows lower courts to
find precedent more frequently than with other interpretations of the
Marks rule,42 which frequently require a specific configuration of votes
(e.g. 4–1–4),43 or for a concurrence to be an almost identical but
narrower version of the lead opinion.44 It is also attractive because for
each proposition that has precedential value, a majority of the justices on
the court have approved of it.45
Those against letting dissents contribute to the narrowest grounds
argue that this practice is at odds with the judicial tradition of
considering anything outside of what is necessary for arriving at the
judgment to be dicta.46 Since dissents “by definition, are not necessary to
the judgment,” it is arguable that most assertions within them are dicta.47
But, under the all opinions approach, dissents are sometimes necessary
37. See, e.g., Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745–46; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325; Hughes v. United States, 584
U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1771–72 (2018) (punting the issue of how lower federal courts should
interpret Marks). Despite initial attempts to punt the issue of proper plurality interpretation, the
majority of the Washington State Supreme Court justices at least appears to have implicitly agreed
on a method of interpretation; see also infra section I.A.2.
38. See Williams, supra note 36, at 799 n.9, 818–19.
39. See id. at 817.
40. See Re, supra note 2, at 1988. Professor Ryan Williams also discusses this approach but calls
it the “issue-by-issue approach.” Williams, supra note 36, at 803.
41. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977); see Re, supra note 2, at 1988.
42. See Re, supra note 2, at 1989.
43. See Williams, supra note 36, at 813–15 (describing the “fifth vote approach”).
44. See id. at 808 (describing the “implicit consensus approach”).
45. See id. at 817.
46. See id. at 819.
47. See id.
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to the judgment.48
Another issue with the all opinions approach is that it is susceptible to
voting paradoxes if the Court’s internal procedures do not take reasoning
into consideration when voting on the judgment.49 A voting paradox
occurs when a party wins on each of the issues considered by the court,
but the judgment goes against them.50 This is more likely to occur when
a court ignores the reasoning for each justice’s vote. On a basic level, the
court has two options for voting on the judgment: “outcome voting” or
“issue-voting.”51 Outcome voting looks to the conclusions at the end of
each opinion and ignores the reasoning (the justice’s conclusions
regarding each issue).52 Alternatively, issue-voting takes those
conclusions reached on each issue into account while ignoring the
conclusions at the end of the opinions.53
As an example of a voting paradox, consider the following scenario.
A court is deciding whether a plaintiff has standing overall, but focuses
on aspects of standing: whether the injury is (1) traceable or (2) too
speculative. Three justices think that the plaintiff has standing because
the injury is traceable and not too speculative; three think that the
plaintiff does not have standing because injury is traceable but too
speculative; and three think the plaintiff does not have standing because
the injury was not traceable despite the injury not being too speculative.
If the justices decide to vote based on each justice’s opinion on the
judgment in its totality, the plaintiff will lose: two of the opinions come
to the overall conclusion that the plaintiff does not have standing. But if
the justices decide to vote based on the conclusions reached for each
issue, the plaintiff prevails: within the opinions, six justices agree both
that the injury was traceable and not too speculative. See Table 1 below:

48. See infra notes 89–97 and accompanying text.
49. See Re, supra note 2, at 2005. Re notes that voting on issues, rather than the judgment, might
make deriving precedent from cross-judgment majorities “worthwhile.” Id. Further, he states that
“so long as outcome voting remains in place, majority agreement across the judgment would
paradoxically create a precedent that contradicted the judgment in that very case.” Id. at 2005–06.
50. Meyerson, supra note 1, at 901.
51. David Post & Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by
Multijudge Panels, 80 GEO. L.J. 743, 743–44 (1992).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 744.

19 - Clark (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

1998

1/16/2020 3:45 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:1989

Table 1:
Voting Paradox
Opinion label
and number
of votes
Lead Opinion
(3 votes)
Concurrence
(3 votes)
Dissent
(3 votes)

Is the injury
traceable to the
conduct of the
defendant?
No

Is the injury too
speculative?

Judgment

No

Plaintiff loses

Yes

Yes

Plaintiff loses

Yes

No

Plaintiff wins

Plaintiff wins
(6–0)

Plaintiff wins
(6–0)

Plaintiff loses
(6–0)

Voting paradoxes can create instability within the justice system. In
the case discussed in Table 1, the plaintiff loses. But if a lower court
used the all opinions approach to derive precedent from the case in Table
1 to rule on a new case with identical facts and issues, that plaintiff
would prevail.
2.

Washington Chooses an Interpretation of the Marks Rule

In 1989, the Court implicitly used the Marks rule to interpret one of
its own prior decisions,54 but went back and forth for almost a decade on
whether Marks actually applied.55 When the Court officially adopted the
Marks rule in the 1998 decision Davidson v. Hensen,56 it mirrored

54. Southcenter Joint Venture v. Nat’l Democratic Policy Comm’n, 113 Wash. 2d 413, 780 P.2d
1282 (1989) (determining the holding of the fragmented decision in Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash.
Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981)).
55. Compare Zeuger v. Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 57 Wash. App. 584, 789 P.2d 326 (1990)
(applying the Marks rule explicitly in a state law matter), with State v. Zakel (Zakel II), 119 Wash.
2d 563, 568, 834 P.2d 1046, 1048 (1992) (punting the issue of whether the Court would use the
Marks rule to analyze a previous fragmented decision, State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d
1199 (1980)).
56. 135 Wash. 2d 112, 128, 954 P.2d 1327 (1998).
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Marks’s language: “[w]here there is no majority agreement as to the
rationale for a decision, the holding of the court is the position taken by
those concurring on the narrowest grounds.”57
But adopting federal precedent resulted in further confusion. The
federal debate on Marks application was not well developed at the time
that the rule was adopted by state courts.58 While the Court seemed to
have settled what precedential value fragmented decisions held,59 the
Court never explicitly stated which version of Marks they intended to
use.
The story of how the Court chose an interpretation begins with
Bosteder v. City of Renton.60 In Bosteder, the plaintiff filed trespass
claims against several city employees in their individual capacities after
they allegedly searched his building without legal authority.61 The lower
court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against the individuals in summary
judgment because he failed to follow the requirements of a claim-filing
statute: namely, he gave the city notice that he was filing a claim but did
not wait sixty days to actually do so as required by statute.62 The
plaintiff appealed, arguing that his failure to wait did not matter because
the claim-filing statute did not apply to individuals.63
The Court’s Bosteder decision was fragmented.64 The four justices in
the lead opinion stated that the statute applied to individuals for acts in
the scope of employment and dismissed Bosteder’s claim for failing to
comply with the sixty day waiting period.65 Four justices concurred in
part, agreeing with the lead opinion that the plaintiff had not filed
correctly, and dissented in part, stating that the claim-filing statute was
inapplicable to individuals.66 The one remaining justice concurred in part
and dissented in part “agree[ing] with the [lead opinion] except as it
57. Id. at 1335 (first citing State v. Zakel (Zakel I), 61 Wash. App. 805, 808, 812 P.2d 512, 514
(1991), then citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)).
58. See Re, supra note 2, at 1960 (discussing how the Marks rule laid dormant until the early
1990s, and rapidly increasing “in the early 2000s”).
59. See section I.A.2.
60. 155 Wash. 2d 18, 117 P.3d 316 (2005).
61. Bosteder, 155 Wash. 2d at 25, 117 P.3d at 319. The plaintiff also filed a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), which adds to the complexity of the decision in this case and how the Court
labeled the opinions. Bosteder, 155 Wash. 2d at 27, 117 P.3d at 320.
62. Wright v. Terrell (Wright I), 135 Wash. App. 722, 145 P.3d 1230 (2006), rev’d, Wright II,
162 Wash. 2d 192, 170 P.3d 570 (2007); see WASH. REV. CODE § 4.96.020(4) (2001).
63. Bosteder, 155 Wash. 2d at 27, 41, 117 P.3d at 320, 327.
64. Id. at 51, 59, 117 P.3d at 332, 336.
65. Id. at 24, 117 P.3d at 318 (lead opinion).
66. Id. at 51, 117 P.3d at 332 (Sanders, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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[held] that the claim filing statute applies to individuals.”67 Ultimately,
five justices agreed that the claim-filing statute did not apply to
individuals, and all nine agreed that Bosteder had failed to comply with
the filing procedure. See Table 2 below:
Table 2:
Bosteder Holdings
Opinion label and
number of votes

Is the statute
applicable to
individuals?

Judgment

Lead opinion
(4 votes)68

Yes

Dismissal of Bosteder’s
claim affirmed

Dissent69
(4 votes)70

No

Dismissal of Bosteder’s
claim reversed

Dissent
(1 vote)71

No

Dismissal of Bosteder’s
claim reversed

Statute not
applicable to
individuals
(5–4)

Dismissal of Bosteder’s
claim reversed
(5–4)

The lack of clarity in the Bosteder decision was apparent when the
Division II Court of Appeals applied Bosteder’s holding to a new set of
facts in Wright v. Terrell (Wright I).72 The appellants in Wright I argued
that the same claim-filing statute at issue in Bosteder was inapplicable to
individuals.73 They cited Davidson to direct the court to interpret the
67. Id. at 59, 117 P.3d at 336 (Ireland, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. Id. at 24, 117 P.3d at 318 (lead opinion).
69. The justices who dissented on the claim-filing statute issue concurred in the judgment with the
lead opinion on the § 1983 claim, so these opinions were technically only partial dissents.
70. Bosteder, 155 Wash. 2d at 51, 117 P.3d at 332 (Sanders, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
71. Id. at 59, 117 P.3d at 336 (Ireland, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. 135 Wash. App. 722, 145 P.3d 1230 (2006), rev’d, Wright II, 162 Wash. 2d 192, 170 P.3d 570
(2007).
73. Id. at 735, 145 P.3d at 1238.
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“narrowest grounds” of the Bosteder opinion to include the dissenting
opinions.74 The court of appeals rejected this argument, because the
judgment in Bosteder implied that the court’s holding was that the
claim-filing statute applied to individuals.75 The court also opined that
plurality opinions only had “limited precedential value and [are] not
binding on the courts.”76
The Washington State Supreme Court reversed Wright I, stating that
the court had “misread” Bosteder.77 But the main issue was not that the
court of appeals had misread Bosteder—it was that they were using the
wrong method of deriving precedential value from fragmented decisions.
While the court of appeals seemed to endorse either no Marks rule at all,
or an implied emphasis on concurrences being necessary to form the
“narrowest grounds,” the Wright II Court announced that dissents could
contribute to precedent formation.78 The Court noted that while
Bosteder’s lead opinion stated that the claim-filing statute did not apply
to individual government employees, that opinion had only four votes.79
Then the Court combined Justice Sanders’s dissent, which had four total
votes, and Justice Ireland’s concurrence/dissent to create binding
precedent: “[a] majority of this court thus concluded that [the] former
[claim-filing statute] does not apply to claims against individuals. On
this point, Bosteder [was] not a plurality decision.”80 Thus, Wright II
created a rule that endorsed the all-opinions approach.81
Despite approving the Wright rule unanimously, the Court did not
fully embrace the Wright rule until 2015.82 In fact, it was as if the
decision was forgotten for several years. In the interim, the Court battled
against itself, with some supporting a version of Marks that required
concurrence in the judgment, and others insisting that dissents could
count as well.83 That debate cooled off after the Court explicitly clarified
74. Id.
75. Id. The idea was that if the case was dismissed on the grounds that filing was improper, it was
implied that it was also applicable to individuals. See id.
76. Id. (first citing In re Pers. Restraint of Isadore, 151 Wash. 2d 294, 302, 88 P.3d 390, 394
(2004), then citing State v. Gonzalez, 77 Wash. App. 479, 486, 891 P.2d 743, 746–47 (1995)).
77. Wright II, 162 Wash. 2d at 194, 170 P.3d at 570; see also Bosteder v. City of Renton, 162
Wash. 2d 192, 170 P.3d 570 (2007).
78. Wright II, 162 Wash. 2d at 195–96, 170 P.3d at 571 (citing no prior authority for this method
of interpretation).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text (discussing the all-opinions approach).
82. See In re Det. of Reyes, 184 Wash. 2d 340, 358 P.3d. 394 (2015).
83. Id.
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that it would be using the Wright rule in In re Detention of Reyes.84 Even
though Reyes cited Wright II—which was a unanimous decision85—not
every justice deciding Reyes agreed with the majority’s reassertion of the
Wright rule.86 This is because there is an inherent problem with the
Wright rule: no clear line exists between what actually has precedential
value and what is merely dicta.87
3.

Dicta as Precedent? Issues with the Wright Rule

The Court has not expressly outlined the boundaries of what counts as
precedent under Wright rule. As a result, the line between dicta and
precedent has become blurry. This has led at least one justice on the
Court who previously endorsed the Wright rule to reject it.88
Wright’s blurriness between dicta and holdings became apparent
when the Court tried to interpret the fragmented decision, Colorado
Structures, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the West.89 Colorado Structures concerned
whether an insurance company was liable under a surety bond, and
whether the court could impose Olympic Steamship fees90 on the
insurance company if they were.91 Four justices agreed that the insurance
company was liable under the surety bond, and that they could apply
Olympic Steamship fees.92 Two concurring justices agreed that the

84. 184 Wash. 2d 340, 346, 358 P.3d 394, 379 (2015). Two years earlier, the Court implicitly
used the Wright rule to interpret In re Det. of D.F.F, 172 Wash. 2d 37, 256 P.3d 357 (2011) (en
banc). See Saleemi v. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc., 176 Wash. 2d 368, 385–86, 292 P.3d 108, 116 (2013)
(citing both the concurrence and dissent from In re D.F.F., the majority opinion asserted that “[f]ive
justices of this court explicitly rejected the proposition that the concept of ‘structural error’ had a
place outside of criminal law”).
85. Wright II was a per curiam opinion. 162 Wash. 2d 192, 170 P.3d 570 (2007). According to
the Court’s internal rules, all per curiam opinions are unanimous decisions. INTERNAL PROCEDURES
MANUAL, supra note 13, at II-8.
86. Justice McCloud disagreed with the majority’s use of the Wright rule in Reyes and was not
sitting on the Court at the time Wright II was decided. See In re Det. of Reyes, 184 Wash. 2d. at
353–54, 358 P.3d at 401 (McCloud, J., concurring); Justice Sheryl Gordon McCloud, WASH. CTS.,
https://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts/supreme/bios/?fa=scbios.display_file&fileID=gor
don_mccloud [https://perma.cc/NU24-N3Q3].
87. See In re Det. of Reyes, 184 Wash. 2d at 353–54, 358 P.3d at 401 (McCloud, J., concurring).
88. See infra notes 100–104and accompanying text (discussing Justice Madsen’s repudiation of
the Wright rule).
89. 161 Wash. 2d 577, 167 P.3d 1125 (2007).
90. Olympic Steamship fees apply when “[a]n insured who is compelled to assume the burden of
legal action to obtain the benefit of its insurance contract is entitled to attorney fees.” Olympic S.S.
Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 117 Wash. 2d 37, 54, 811 P.2d 673, 682 (1991).
91. See Colo. Structures, 161 Wash. 2d at 586, 167 P.3d at 1129.
92. Id. at 581, 167 P.3d at 1127.
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insurance company was liable under the surety bond, but that Olympic
Steamship fees did not apply.93 Justice Sanders, dissenting on the issue
of whether the insurance company was liable under the surety bond,
concurred in part on the issue of whether Olympic Steamship fees
applied.94 He noted that liability and fees were separate issues.95
Combining the four votes in the lead opinion with Justice Sanders’s
dissent, the Court awarded Olympic Steamship fees.96 This decision
implicitly supported the Wright rule because it based a judgment on a
cross-judgment majority.97 See Table 3 below:

93. Id. at 608–10, 167 P.3d at 1142–43 (Alexander, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
94. Id. at 638, 167 P.3d at 1145–46 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. See Clerk’s Ruling Regarding Setting of Att’y Fees & Am. Clerk’s Ruling on Costs at 2 &
n.2, Colo. Structures, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the W., 161 Wash. 2d 577, 167 P.3d 1125 (2007) (No.
76973-7) (awarding Olympic Steamship fees, citing the conclusion of the lead opinion as the court’s
holding: “This Court’s opinion in the CONCLUSION section in part states: ‘Olympic Steamship
attorney fees apply to performance bonds.’”). Writing for the majority in Vinci, Justice Yu cited this
Clerk’s ruling to demonstrate that Justice Sanders’s dissent contributed to the outcome of the case.
See King Cty. v. Vinci Constr. Grands Projets/Parsons RCI/Frontier-Kemper, JV, 188 Wash. 2d
618, 626, 398 P.3d 1093, 1097 (2017). The implication is that Justice Sanders’s opinion regarding
Olympic Steamship fees should not be considered dictum. See also id. at 626 n.1, 398 P.3d at 1097
n.1 (citing Matsyuk v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 173 Wash. 2d 643, 660 n.5, 272 P.3d 802,
811 n.5 (2012)) (noting that although Matsyuk stated that Colorado Structures created no precedent
regarding Olympic Steamship fees, that statement itself was not essential to the Matsyuk decision
and was just dictum).
97. Note that while the Court issued Colorado Structures two months before Wright II, it
implicitly supports the rule that Wright II expressly supported.
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Table 3:
Colorado Structures Holdings
Opinion label
and number of
votes
Lead Opinion
(4 votes)

Is the
Insurance
Company
liable under
the bond?
Yes

Dissent 1
(2 votes)

Yes

Dissent 2
(2 votes)

Yes

Dissent 3
(1 vote)

No

Liable under
bond, 8–1

Do Olympic
Judgment
Steamship fees
apply?
Yes

Insurance company
liable and must pay
Olympic Steamship
fees
No
Insurance company
liable but no
Olympic Steamship
fees
No
Insurance company
liable but no
Olympic Steamship
fees
Yes
Insurance company
not liable and no
Olympic Steamship
fees
Olympic
Insurance
Steamship fees company is liable
apply, 5–4
and must pay
Olympic
Steamship fees

In King County v. Vinci Construction Grands Projets,98 the Court
revisited Colorado Structures. In Vinci, a six-justice majority of the
Court reasoned that it was completely appropriate to apply Olympic
Steamship fees under the precedent set in Colorado Structures, and
endorsed the Wright rule.99 But Justice Madsen dissented, arguing that
Colorado Structures “did not create binding precedent” because the lead
98. 188 Wash. 2d 618, 398 P.3d 1093 (2017).
99. Id. at 626, 398 P.3d at 1097 (citing In re Det. of Reyes, 184 Wash. 2d 340, 346, 358 P.3d 394,
397 (2015)).
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opinion only had four votes.100 Essentially, Justice Madsen was
unwilling to count Justice Sanders’s vote because his opinion was
labeled as a dissent.101 But by 2015, Justice Madsen had implicitly
approved the Wright rule twice102—so what happened?
We can’t be sure, but Justice Madsen’s concurrence from the 2010
decision, State v. Rhone103 provides some insight. The defendant in
Rhone argued that the prosecuting attorney’s peremptory challenge
against the only remaining member of the defendant’s racial group
amounted to a prima facie case for a Batson violation.104 Four justices in
the lead opinion did not accept the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge as
sufficient evidence to amount to a prima facie case for discrimination
under Batson.105 Going the other way, four dissenting justices advocated
for a bright-line rule that would count this kind of peremptory challenge
as satisfying a prima facie case for a Batson violation .106 Justice Madsen
concurred, agreeing with the lead opinion in the case at hand, but “going
forward” endorsed using the dissent’s bright line rule.107 See Table 4
below:

100. Id. at 635, 398 P.3d at 1105–06 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
101. See Colorado Structures v. Ins. Co. of the W., 161 Wash. 2d 577, 638, 167 P.3d 1125, 1145–
46 (2007) (Sanders, J., dissenting).
102. Madsen approved of the Wright rule in Wright II itself and in Reyes. See Wright II, 162
Wash. 2d at 192, 195, 170 P.3d at 570–71; In re Det. of Reyes, 184 Wash. 2d at 346, 349, 358 P.3d.
at 397, 399 (Madsen, J., concurring).
103. 168 Wash. 2d 645, 229 P.3d 752 (2010).
104. Id. at 648, 229 P.3d at 753; see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (“If the
trial court decides that the facts establish, prima facie, purposeful discrimination and the prosecutor
does not come forward with a neutral explanation for his action, our precedents require that [the]
petitioner’s conviction be reversed.”).
105. Rhone, 168 Wash. 2d at 658, 229 P.3d at 758 (lead opinion).
106. Id. at 658–59, 229 P.3d at 758 (Alexander, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 658, 229 P.3d at 758 (Madsen, J., concurring).
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Table 4:
Rhone Holdings
Opinion label
and number of
votes
Lead Opinion
(4 votes)
Concurrence
(1 vote)
Dissent
(4 votes)

Prima facie case for
discrimination?

Outcome

No

Rhone’s conviction
upheld
Rhone’s conviction
upheld
Rhone’s conviction
overturned
Rhone’s conviction
upheld

Yes, but prospectively only
Yes
This case: No prima facie
case, 5–4
Prospective: Prima facie
case, 5–4

If the Court were to apply the Wright rule to Rhone, would Justice
Madsen’s prospective ruling have precedential value? It is not easy to
say. Facing an almost identical situation three years later in State v.
Meredith,108 the Court held that Madsen’s prospective ruling was
“merely dicta.”109 This was because her statement “[did] not relate to the
disposition of Rhone.”110 In her concurrence, Justice Madsen countered
that she thought the rule should apply only “going forward” because she
would add an extra requirement that courts, prosecutors, and defendants
have notice of the rule before applying it.111 Justices González and
Chambers opined in their dissents that they would have given
precedential weight to Justice Madsen’s Rhone concurrence.112 It is
unclear why Justice Madsen chose to sign on to the majority opinion in
Reyes, which endorsed the Wright rule, without mentioning the
contradiction that Meredith posed.
In Justice Madsen’s Vinci dissent, she then used the Meredith/Rhone
issue to argue that the Wright rule was expressly rejected by the Court.113
108. 178 Wash. 2d 180, 306 P.3d 942 (2013).
109. Id. at 184, 306 P.3d at 944.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 185, 306 P.3d at 945 (Madsen, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 189–90, 306 P.3d at 947 (González, J., dissenting); id. at 191–92, 306 P.3d at 948
(Chambers, J., dissenting).
113. See King Cty. v. Vinci Constr. Grands Projets, 188 Wash. 2d 618, 635–37, 398 P.3d 1093,
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She argued that under Meredith, the Court must hold that language
supporting prospective rulings is dicta because it does not contribute to
the judgment of the case at hand.114 Thus, following Justice Madsen’s
line of reasoning, Justice Sanders’s assertion in Colorado Structures
regarding the application of Olympic Steamship fees was a prospective
ruling.115 This is because he disagreed with a majority of the court on
whether the insurance company was liable under the surety bond, which
is a prerequisite to an Olympic Steamship fee award.116Accordingly,
Justice Madsen advocated for adopting a version of the Marks rule that
requires concurrence in the judgment, and admitted that the Court’s
“jurisprudence has been less than clear on how to determine what, if any,
legal principles from a fractured opinion are precedential.”117
Justice McCloud’s dissent in Reyes also pointed out the problem that
Meredith posed for the majority’s Wright rule.118 She agreed with the
majority that separate opinions could contribute to the holding in a case,
but that “two additional prerequisites” must be present: “(1) that
principle of law must be necessary for the decision in the case rather
than just dicta and (2) that principle of law must be the narrowest
ground of agreement rather than the broadest.”119 Justices McCloud and
Madsen highlight an important issue with the Wright rule: does the
Wright rule conflate dicta with statements that have precedential value?
B.

The Second Factor: The Court’s Internal Procedures for Assigning
Opinions

The Court’s procedures assign lead opinions based on efficiency at
the expense of increased fragmentation. When a case first comes to the
court, one justice prepares a pre-hearing report on the case.120 After
arguments, the justices vote on whether to affirm, reverse, or remand on
each of the major issues in the case.121 If five justices agree on the
1106 (2017) (Madsen, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 635, 398 P.3d at 1106.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 636, 398 P.3d at 1106.
118. In re Det. of Reyes, 184 Wash. 2d 340, 353–54, 358 P.3d 394, 401 (2015) (McCloud, J.,
concurring).
119. Id.
120. See INTERNAL PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 13 at II-4.
121. Laura Anglin, Law Clerk to the Honorable Justice González, Wash. Superior Court,
Presentation at the King County Bar Association Appellate Practice September Section Meeting:
Did You Know the Temple of Justice Has a West Wing?: A Judicial Factotum Answers (Some of)
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judgment on “at least one of the major issues,”122 and the justice who
prepared the pre-hearing report is in the majority, that justice is assigned
to write the majority opinion.123 At this conference, or after circulation
of the majority opinion, the justices may decide to draft concurring or
dissenting opinions.124
The author of the majority opinion may change after the concurrences
and dissents circulate.125 After reading the circulated opinions, the
justices sign on to their preferred opinions and the chief justice
determines whether the majority opinion still has five signatures on “at
least one of the major issues.”126 If a concurrence or dissent now garners
a “majority” of the signatures, the chief justice will reassign the duty of
writing the majority opinion to the author of that concurrence or
dissent.127
The Court’s process for assigning opinions contributes to the
confusion. Although the Court’s reassignment process accounts for
shifts of opinion in the court, it only does so when a majority, not a
plurality, signs on to a concurrence or a dissent.128 This accounts for
why certain fragmented decisions handed down by the court have lead
opinions which garner only one signature.129 Furthermore, the Court’s
procedure completely disregards whether a rule promoted by a
concurrence actually has the assent of the majority of the court.130 This
mismatch between the Court’s method for precedent generation and its
voting procedures poses the risk of the court issuing a paradoxical
decision.131
Your Burning Questions (Sept. 9, 2019) [hereinafter Anglin KCBA Presentation]. This is an “issue
vote,” which focuses on the outcome of each issue without considering the rationale behind such a
decision. See Post & Salop, supra note 51, at 743–44.
122. INTERNAL PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 13, at II-6.
123. Anglin KCBA Presentation, supra note 121.
124. INTERNAL PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 13, at II-5.
125. Id.
126. Id. at II-6.
127. Id. If the author of the concurring opinion and the original majority opinion writer can agree
within two days on how to compromise to change the majority opinion so it garners the majority of
signatures, the opinion is not reassigned. Id. at II-5.
128. See id.
129. See State v. Schierman, No. 84614-6, slip op. at 203 (Wash. Apr. 12, 2018).
130. See State v. Schierman, 192 Wash. 2d 577, 438 P.3d 1063 (2018) (fragmented decision).
Within the various opinions, a majority of the court assented to the rules supporting Justice Yu’s
resolution of the case on both issues. Despite the lead opinion writer’s disagreement with the
majority of the court in the judgment on one of the issues, Justice Yu was not assigned the lead
opinion. See id. at 593–94, 438 P.3d at 1072 (lead opinion); infra section II.B.
131. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text.
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The Third Factor: How the Justices Sign On to Opinions

As demonstrated by the frequency that the Washington State Supreme
Court issues fragmented decisions, the justices struggle to garner the
signatures of their colleagues.132 The resulting array of concurrences,
partial concurrences, and dissents resembles antiquated and disfavored
seriatim opinions.133 In seriatim opinions, instead of issuing a single
opinion speaking for the court, each justice sitting on the case writes a
separate opinion.134 This practice forces readers to piece together
precedent on their own without any guidance.
Prior to Chief Justice John Marshall’s arrival at the United States
Supreme Court, the Court frequently issued seriatim opinions.135 Justice
Marshall established the practice of one “particular Justice speaking for
the Court . . . [while the] other Justices were able to express their views
separately” in concurrences and dissents.136 Although this switch
simplified the task of determining precedent, it has also elicited
criticism.137 Thomas Jefferson disfavored the switch because it
decreased the individual accountability of the justices.138 Others have
noted that this emphasis on the Court speaking with a “‘single
voice’ . . . . meant that differences among the justices were adjusted
internally and, consequently, hidden from public view . . . [and] the
contributions of individual justices were difficult, if not impossible, to
discern.”139
In Washington State, most of the fragmented decisions involve
important constitutional issues or matters of public interest.140 And
132. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
133. See, generally Schierman, 192 Wash. 2d 577, 438 P.3d 1063 (2018) (issuing a 1–1–3–3–1
decision). Seriatim decisions have repeatedly been recognized as an inefficient method of
interpretation. See Re, supra note 2, at 2004 n. 331.
134. Seriatim, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
135. John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court 1790–
1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 140 (1999). The Court borrowed this practice from the common law
courts of England. Id. The Court also issued opinions “By the Court” (which were essentially per
curiam opinions) that were mostly unanimous. Id. Likely reasons for issuing a seriatim decision
were that there was disagreement among the Justices and for discussion of constitutional issues. Id.
at 140–41.
136. Kelsh, supra note 135, at 138.
137. Id. at 145.
138. Id.
139. Scott Douglas Gerber, The Supreme Court Before John Marshall, in SERIATIM: THE
SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 1, 20 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 1998).
140. See generally In re Pers. Restraint of Fero, 190 Wash. 2d 1, 409 P.3d 214 (2018) (appealing
a conviction for first-degree child assault); Roake v. Delman, 189 Wash. 2d 775, 408 P.3d 658
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because the justices are elected, they have a higher incentive to protect
their own records than federal justices with lifetime appointments. Many
would see these disjointed opinions as a sign of dysfunction on the
Court.141 But others have pointed out that the style that the Court
disseminates its opinions in is an alternative mode of expressing its
power, rather than a sign of dysfunction.142
Justice J.M. Johnson expressed a similar sentiment in his
concurrence/dissent in State v. Ruem.143 In Ruem, Justice Johnson voiced
his support for the Wright rule, arguing that it was inappropriate for the
Washington State Supreme Court to use an interpretation of the federal
Marks rule that requires concurrence in the judgment because the state
and Federal judiciaries are inherently different.144 He noted that these
inherent differences begin with the very way that the justices arrive on
the court: “[w]e are elected directly by the people rather than appointed.
We interpret two constitutions, not just one.”145 If part of the Court’s
power lies within each justice’s ability to freely concur or dissent in
separate opinions, it makes sense for the court to update its procedures
so readers can find precedential value within cases more easily.

(2018) (concerning a motion to dismiss a temporary sexual assault protection order); State v.
Jefferson, 192 Wash. 2d 225, 429 P.3d 467 (2018) (ruling on a Batson challenge raised by an
individual convicted of attempted first degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm); State v.
Sassen Van Elsloo, 191 Wash. 2d 798, 425 P.3d 807 (2018) (addressing whether a trial error
warranted granting a new trial to an individual convicted of drug trafficking with several firearm
enhancements); State v. Schierman, 192 Wash. 2d 577, 438 P.3d 1063 (2018) (appealing a
conviction for four counts of aggravated first-degree murder and a resulting death sentence); El
Centro de la Raza v. State, 192 Wash. 2d 103, 428 P.3d 1143 (2013) (addressing whether an act
establishing charter schools was permissible under the state constitution).
141. See Chief Justice John Roberts, Address at Georgetown University, Class of 2006, at 13:22
(May 21, 2006), https://www.c-span.org/video/?192685-1/georgetown-university-law-centercommencement-address [https://perma.cc/6ALW-QTXV] (describing the benefits of unanimous
decisions and compromise on the Court) (“It is the obligation of each member on the Court to be
open to the considered views of the others. We are a collegial and collegiate Court, not simply
because we act after voting, but because we work together to function as a Court in deciding the
cases and in crafting the opinions.”).
142. M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent,
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 285 (2007).
143. 179 Wash. 2d 195, 220, 313 P.3d 1156, 1170 n.7 (2013) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
144. Id.
145. Id.
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EXAMPLES OF WASHINGTON’S FRAGMENTED
DECISIONS

The clash between the Washington State Supreme Court’s method of
precedent formation and ascribing precedential value to its opinion
results in a common set of reoccurring questions: Where is the holding
within the various opinions? Why does the lead opinion only have one
vote? And does the lead opinion have any precedential value at all?
A.

Where’s the Holding?

Frequently, the fifth vote for a major holding might be hiding in what
seems to be a hastily added final line in a concurrence or dissent. This
unfortunately results in many first-time readers coming to the wrong
conclusion about the holding. El Centro de la Raza v. State146 is just that
kind of case. In El Centro de la Raza, the Court had to decide whether
four separate provisions of the Charter School Act were unconstitutional,
and if any of them were, if they were severable from the rest of the
act.147
Justice Yu wrote the lead opinion of the court.148 The lead opinion,
with four total signatures, said that one provision of the Act concerning
collective bargaining149 was unconstitutional, but that the rest of the act
could survive because that provision was severable.150 Justices González
and Fairhurst concurred with the entirety of Justice Yu’s opinion except
for the conclusion that the collective bargaining provision violated the
state constitution.151 In the second-to-last line of his opinion, González
quickly stated that he agreed with Justice Yu on the severability of the

146. 192 Wash. 2d 103, 428 P.3d 1143 (2018).
147. The five issues were: (1) whether the act satisfied the Washington State Constitution’s
uniformity requirement for public schools; (2) whether the act facially violated the superintendent of
public instruction’s supervisory role; (3) whether the act on its face violated the Washington State
Constitution’s requirement that all revenue from the common school fund be exclusively applied to
common schools; (4) whether the act’s provision revising collective bargaining rights of charter
school employees violated the Washington State Constitution’s prohibition of amendments by
reference; and (5) whether any offending provisions would be severable from the remainder of the
Act. El Centro de la Raza, 192 Wash. 2d at 110, 428 P.3d at 1146–47. The Court had previously
struck down a prior version of the Charter School Act in League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State,
184 Wash. 2d 393, 413, 355 P.3d 1131, 1141 (2015).
148. Id. at 108, 428 P.3d at 1145. Justices Johnson, Stephens, and McCloud joined Justice Yu’s
lead opinion to form a plurality. Id.
149. See WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.0251 (2019).
150. El Centro de la Raza, 192 Wash. 2d at 133, 428 P.3d at 1158 (lead opinion).
151. Id. (González, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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collective bargaining provision.152 So, among those justices concurring
in the judgment (the four justices who signed the lead opinion and the
two justices who signed the concurrence), four agreed that the collective
bargaining provision is unconstitutional, and six agreed that the
provision is severable.
The remaining three Justices dissented, finding that different
challenged provisions within the Act were unconstitutional and nonseverable.153 Justice Madsen dissented, joined by Justice Owens, stating
that she thought that the Act violated the uniformity requirement for
public schools, and that the superintendent provision was
unconstitutional and non-severable.154 Justice Wiggins also dissented,
and Justice Owens signed on to his opinion as well.155 But what Justice
Wiggins labeled as a “dissent,” was not completely a dissent; it was
actually a concurrence-in-part and a dissent-in-part. In his opinion,
Justice Wiggins expressly concurred with the lead opinion except for
where his and Justice Madsen’s differed from it.156
Justice Wiggins and Justice Madsen both believed that the
superintendent provision violated the state constitution and was nonseverable.157 On this point they disagreed with the lead opinion. But
Justice Wiggins only addressed the severability of the superintendent
provision, not the collective bargaining provision.158 Since neither
Justice Wiggins nor Justice Madsen stated that they found the collective
bargaining provision non-severable, it could be inferred that both
justices agreed with the lead opinion on both the unconstitutionality of
the collective bargaining provision and its severability.159 See Table 5
below:

152. Id. at 134, 428 P.3d at 1159.
153. Id. at 135, 428 P.3d at 1159 (Madsen, J., dissenting); id. at 151–52, 428 P.3d at 1167
(Wiggins, J., dissenting). Justice Owens joined both the dissents of Justices Madsen and Wiggins.
Id. at 135, 142, 428 P.3d at 1162, 1167.
154. Id. at 135, 428 P.3d at 1159 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 142, 428 P.3d at 1162 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
156. Id. It is curious that Wiggins did not also add his signature on to Madsen’s dissent, or that
both of their opinions could not be combined into one dissent with three signatures, seeing as his
statement here is an implicit agreement with her opinion. See id.
157. Id. at 151–52, 428 P.3d at 1167 (Wiggins, J., dissenting); id. at 135 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
158. See id. at 151–52, 428 P.3d at 1166–67 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) Each unconstitutional
provision requires a separate severability analysis. See id. at 152, 428 P.3d at 1167 (“A severability
clause indicates that the legislature would have passed the statute without the severed language, but
it is not dispositive. The court must still evaluate whether the act would have been passed even
without unconstitutional provisions.”).
159. See id. at 142, 428 P.3d at 1162 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
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Table 5:
El Centro de la Raza Holdings
Opinion
label and
number of
votes

Collective
bargaining
provision
unconstitu
tional?

Collective
bargaining
provision
severable?

Other parts
of the act
unconstitut
ional and
nonseverable?

Outcome

Lead
Opinion
(4 votes)160
Concurrence
(2 votes)161

Yes

Yes

No

Act survives

No

Yes

No

Act survives

Dissent 1
(2 votes)162
Dissent 2
(2 votes)163

Yes

Yes

Yes

Act fails

Yes

Yes

Yes

Act fails

Collective
bargaining
is
unconstitu
tional, 7–2

Collective
bargaining
provision
is
severable,
9–0

No other
parts of the
act are
both
unconstitut
ional and
nonseverable,
6–3

Act
survives,
6–4

It’s unclear even upon a careful reading of the opinions whether
Justices Wiggins and Madsen agree that the collective bargaining
provision is severable. Perhaps that is why Justice González felt like he
needed to include the hasty sentence at the end of his concurrence
160. El Centro de la Raza, 192 Wash. 2d at 133, 428 P.3d at 1158 (lead opinion).
161. Id. at 133, 135, 428 P.3d at 1158, 1159 (González, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
162. Id. at 135, 428 P.3d at 1159 (Madsen, J., dissenting). Justice Owens joined both the dissents
of Justices Madsen and Wiggins. Id. at 135, 142, 428 P.3d at 1162, 1167.
163. Id. at 142, 151–52, 428 P.3d at 1162, 1167 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
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regarding the severability provision. Regardless, the holdings are unclear
and can only be found through combing through four opinions and
counting up both express and implied statements made by the justices.
B.

Lead Opinions with Only One Vote?

Frequently the Court will issue a opinion that does not garner a
plurality of the Court’s support.164 This occurred in State v.
Schierman,165 where the lead opinion garnered only the author’s
signature.166 In Schierman, Conner Schierman appealed his convictions
on four counts of aggravated first-degree murder and subsequent death
sentence.167 The Court faced two issues: (1) whether errors in the guilt
phase of the trial required reversal of his convictions, and (2) whether
his death sentence was statutorily disproportionate and warranted resentencing.168
After reading the entire 254-page opinion, a reader can piece together
specific holdings in this case.169 Three separate opinions contained a
five-justice majority holding on the guilt phase issue, upholding
Schierman’s conviction.170 Those five justices held that although there
were errors that violated Schierman’s public trial rights, these errors
were de minimis and did not warrant reversal.171 On this issue, a
164. See generally, e.g., Eyman v. Wyman, 191 Wash. 2d 581, 424 P.3d 1183 (2018) (garnering
three signatures on the lead opinion); State v. Sassen Van Elsloo, 192 Wash. 2d 103, 425 P.3d 807
(2018) (garnering only one signature on the lead opinion); State v. Schierman, 192 Wash. 2d 577,
438, P.3d 1063 (2018) (same); State v. Barnes, 189 Wash. 2d 492, 403 P.3d 72 (2017) (same); State
v. Smith, 189 Wash. 2d 655, 405 P.3d 997 (2017) (same); State v. Wilcoxon, 185 Wash. 2d 324,
373 P.3d 224 (2016) (same); Schmidt v. Coogan, 181 Wash. 2d 661, 335 P.3d 424 (2014) (same);
Int’l Marine Underwriters v. ABCD Marine LLC, 179 Wash. 2d 274, 313 P.3d 395 (2013) (same);
McDevitt v. Harborview Med. Ctr., 179 Wash. 2d 59, 316 P.3d 469 (2013) (same); State v.
Saintcalle, 178 Wash. 2d 34, 309 P.3d 326 (2013) (garnering two signatures on the lead opinion).
165. 192 Wash. 2d 577, 438 P.3d 1063 (2018).
166. State v. Schierman, No. 84614-6, slip op. at 203 (Wash. Apr. 12, 2018) (Justice McCloud
wrote the lead opinion.). In fact, there was no plurality opinion in this case: Justice Madsen
concurred independently, Justice Yu’s concurrence garnered the signatures of Justices González and
Wiggins, Justice Stephens dissented and concurred in part and garnered the signatures of Justices
Johnson and Owens, and Justice Fairhurst dissented independently. Id. at 207 (Madsen, J.,
concurring); id. at 232 (Yu, J., concurring); id. at 253 (Stephens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 255 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting).
167. Schierman, 192 Wash. 2d at 593, 438 P.3d at 1072.
168. Id.
169. The original slip opinion was 254 pages long. See Schierman, No. 84614-6 (Wash. Apr. 12,
2018).
170. Schierman, 192 Wash. 2d at 593, 438 P.3d at 1072 (lead opinion); id. at 747, 438 P.3d at
1145 (Madsen, J., concurring); id. at 763, 438 P.3d at 1152 (Yu, J., concurring).
171. Schierman, 192 Wash. 2d at 593, 438 P.3d at 1072 (lead opinion).
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majority of the Court agreed with Justice McCloud’s analysis. A
separate majority upheld Schierman’s death sentence,172 but on this issue
a majority of the Court disagreed with Justice McCloud’s lead
opinion.173 Confusingly, Justice Yu’s concurrence opinion agrees with
the holding of the majority of the Court on both issues, while the lead
opinion does not.174 See Table 6 below:
Table 6:
Schierman Holdings
Opinion label,
author, and
number of votes

Lead Opinion,
McCloud (1)175
Concurrence,
Madsen (1)176

Did a
violation of
Schierman’s
rights
warrant
reversal of
his
conviction?
No

Was the death
sentence
disproportiona
te?

Outcome

Yes

No

Yes

Conviction:
Affirm
Sentence:
Remand
Conviction:
Affirm
Sentence:
Remand

172. Id. at 764, 438 P.3d at 1152 (Yu, J., concurring); id. at 749–50, 438 P.3d at 1146 (Stephens,
J., concurring). Both Justice Yu’s and Justice Stephens’s opinions garnered two additional
signatories, creating a six-justice majority on this issue. Id. at 577, 438 P.3d at 1163.
173. Id. at 593, 438 P.3d at 1072.
174. Justice McCloud summarized the majority’s holdings at the outset of her opinion: “For the
reasons given below, we affirm all of his convictions. As further discussed below, a majority of this
court also rejects Schierman’s challenges to his death sentence.” Schierman, 192 Wash. 2d at 593,
438 P.3d at 1072. But she also addressed the sentencing issue in her own dissent within the lead
opinion: “[h]owever, I would hold that two critical, erroneous evidentiary rulings . . . require
reversal of that death sentence.” Id.
175. Id. at 593, 438 P.3d at 1072.
176. Id. at 747, 438 P.3d at 1145 (Madsen, J., concurring).
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Concurrence/Dis
sent, Yu (3)177

No

No

Concurrence/Dis
sent, Stephens
(3)178

Yes

No

Dissent,
Fairhurst (1)179

Yes

Yes

No: affirm
the
conviction
(5–4)

No: affirm the
death sentence
(6–3)

[Vol. 94:1989
Conviction:
Affirm
Sentence:
Remand
Conviction:
Reverse
Sentence:
Affirm
Conviction:
Reverse
Sentence:
Vacate
Uphold the
conviction and
the sentence

Another perplexing element of this case is that a significant part of the
precedential value isn’t even in the lead opinion. In fact, lower court
opinions and briefs cite directly to Justice Yu’s concurrence as the
holding of the court rather than McCloud’s lead opinion.180 Despite the
guilt-phase issue being the only part of the opinion that the majority
agreed with, Justice McCloud’s discussion did not even contain the
complete holding on that issue.181 A majority of the Court agreed to
apply the test established in Peterson v. Williams,182 but Justice
McCloud’s opinion did not discuss the case.183 Instead, Justice McCloud
referred the reader to Justice Yu’s concurrence for a discussion of why
applying Peterson was appropriate.184 In her concurrence, Justice Yu
asserted with the authority of a majority opinion that “[w]e adopt the de
minimis inquiry established by federal appellate courts’ the wise and
177. Id. at 763, 764, 438 P.3d at 1152 (Yu, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 749–50, 781, 438 P.3d at 1146, 1161 (Stephens, J., concurring).
179. Id. at 781, 480 P.3d at 1161 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting).
180. State v. Karas, 6 Wash. App. 2d 610, 612–13, 620–24, 431 P.3d 1006, 1008, 1013–14
(2018); Brief of Appellant at 12–13, State v. Ali, 8 Wash. App. 2d 1041 (Wash. App. 2018) (No.
77523-5-I).
181. See Schierman, 192 Wash. 2d at 614, 438 P.3d at 1082 (Justice McCloud’s references to
Justice Yu’s concurrence provide a more in-depth discussion of the Court’s opinion).
182. 85 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1996).
183. Id.
184. Schierman, 192 Wash. 2d at 614, 438 P.3d at 1082.
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widely-accepted Peterson test . . . .’”185
The Court’s fragmented decisions also make it hard to discern what
the rule going forward will be. For instance, five justices agreed to
affirm on the guilt-phase issue, but there was no agreement as to whether
the matter was one of first impression or whether prior cases needed to
be overruled to allow de minimis courtroom closures.186 Justices
McCloud and Madsen agreed that this was a matter of first
impression,187 but Justices Yu, González, and Wiggins thought that the
prior cases had to be overturned.188 On this issue, there is no precedential
holding aside from the result.
This lengthy opinion caused considerable confusion as to what the
justices actually agreed upon. Multiple news articles misunderstood and
thereby mischaracterized the justices’ agreement with McCloud’s
opinion.189 After relating Justice McCloud’s reasoning for upholding
Schierman’s conviction, one article stated that Justices Fairhurst and
Madsen “agreed with McCloud’s opinion.”190 But Justice Fairhurst did
not agree with McCloud’s judgment or reasoning in the guilt phase
portion of the trial.191 And Justice Madsen agreed in the judgment but
not the reasoning in the sentencing-phase portion of Justice McCloud’s
opinion; she thought that the death penalty sentence was
disproportionate only as applied to Schierman’s conviction, rather than
agreeing with McCloud that all death penalty cases were
disproportionate sentences.192
In effect, this opinion diminishes accountability of the court and
creates unclear standards for lower courts. If citations for binding
authority point future litigants and courts to a concurrence, there will
185. Id. at 768, 438 P.3d at 1154 (quoting United States v. Ivester, 316 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir.
2003))
186. Id. at 748, 438 P.3d at 1145.
187. Id. at 610–11, 438 P.3d at 1080 (lead opinion); id. at 747, 438 P.3d at 1145 (Madsen, J.,
concurring).
188. Id. at 767, 438 P.3d at 1154 (Yu, J., concurring).
189. Martha Bellisle, Supreme Court Upholds Conviction, Death Sentence, ASSOCIATED PRESS
NEWS (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/abf05b11eb8c416db38f7117b25d733c
[https://perma.cc/3FV8-5454]; Sarah J. Green, Divided Supreme Court Upholds Death Sentence for
Man Who Killed Kirkland Family in 2006, SEATTLE TIMES (June 12, 2018, 2:02 PM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/divided-supreme-court-upholds-death-sentencefor-man-who-killed-kirkland-family-in-2006/ [https://perma.cc/5NQR-72JA].
190. Green, supra note 189.
191. See Schierman, 192 Wash. 2d at 781, 438 P.3d at 1161 (Fairhurst, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 747, 438 P.3d at 1145 (Madsen, J., concurring). Madsen actually specifically states her
agreement with the reasoning on the validity of death sentences in general within Justice Yu’s
concurrence. Id.
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inevitably be confusion as to whether that opinion is actually binding or
not.
C.

Is the Lead Opinion Authoritative at All?

Sometimes a lead opinion is misleading when looking for the holding
in a case. Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. LTK Consulting Services, Inc.193 is an
example of such a case. This case arose as a result of an electrical fire on
the Seattle monorail in 2004, after which Seattle Monorail Services lost
millions of dollars in revenue.194 Seattle Monorail Services had a
contract with the city to operate the monorail that required them to take
out fire insurance.195 The city had a separate contract with LTK
Consulting Services (LTK) to maintain the monorail.196 Seattle Monorail
Services’s insurance company, Affiliated, sued to recoup the lost
revenue from LTK for negligently maintaining the monorail’s electrical
system.197 LTK countered that it was not liable in tort for the lost
revenue because the economic loss rule barred Affiliated’s claim.198 A
federal district court granted summary judgment to LTK, and when
Affiliated appealed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sent a certified
question to the Washington State Supreme Court:199 it asked whether
Affiliated had the right to sue LTK when Seattle Monorail Services and
LTK were not in privity of contract.200
All nine justices agreed on the judgment in the case: that LTK was
not barred from tort recovery against LTK.201 But ironically, the only
reasoning that a majority of the Court agreed upon was that the lead
opinion’s reasoning was incorrect.202
On the same day, the Court issued a companion case: Eastwood v.
Horse Harbor Foundation.203 In Eastwood, the Court replaced the
193. 170 Wash. 2d 442, 243 P.3d 521 (2010).
194. Id. at 443–44, 243 P.3d at 523.
195. Id. at 445, 243 P.3d at 523–24.
196. Id. at 445, 243 P.3d at 524.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 447, 243 P.3d at 524–25.
200. Id. at 449, 243 P.3d at 525.
201. Id. at 461, 243 P.3d at 532 (lead opinion); id. (Chambers, J. concurring); id. at 476, 243 P.3d
at 539–540.
202. See Affiliated, 170 Wash. 2d at 461, 243 P.3d at 532 (Chambers, J., concurring); id. at 476,
243 P.3d at 539–40 (Madsen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
203. 170 Wash. 2d 380, 241 P.3d 1256 (2010).
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economic loss rule with the independent duty doctrine.204 The economic
loss rule was a defense to contract suits which would bar recovery for
any injury that was purely economic in nature.205 Essentially, instead of
looking at whether the injury was economic loss, the Court would look
to see if the defendant had a duty arising independent of an existing
contract.206 Despite there being no privity of contract between the parties
in Affiliated, the lead opinion applied the independent duty doctrine and
found that LTK owed Seattle Monorail Services a duty.207 Seven justices
agreed that the lead opinion erroneously applied the independent duty
doctrine because the case only concerned an ordinary tort action, and the
independent duty doctrine was a defense only to contract suits.208 Due to
this agreement, the precedential holding in Affiliated is that applying the
independent duty doctrine is inappropriate in tort suits.209 This sharply
contrasts with the lead opinion’s assertion that Affiliated could sue
because it was permissible under an independent duty doctrine
analysis.210 This may seem like a fairly benign distinction, but it has farreaching effects for the future scope of the independent duty doctrine’s
application. Under the lead opinion’s analysis, this contract law defense
would extend to defend tort actions as well.211
As discussed below, even though a majority of the justices agreed that
the independent duty doctrine was inapplicable in this case, many
citations to this case erroneously indicate that the reasoning from the
lead opinion has precedential value. Despite what the lead opinion says,
the only precedent formed in Affiliated was that the Court will not apply
the independent duty analysis to ordinary tort claims.212
One law review article mistakenly cites the analysis in Affiliated’s
lead opinion as the holding of the Court: “Affiliated established a new
framework to determine when economic loss is recoverable in tort.” 213
204. Id.
205. Id. at 387, 241 P.3d at 1261.
206. See id. at 383, 241 P.3d at 1259 (lead opinion).
207. Affiliated, 170 Wash. 2d at 460–461, 243 P.3d at 532.
208. Affiliated, 170 Wash. 2d at 461, 243 P.3d at 532 (Chambers, J., concurring); id. at 476, 243
P.3d at 539–40 (Madsen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 461, 243 P.3d at 532 (Chambers, J., concurring).
212. See id. at 461, 243 P.3d at 532 (Chambers, J., concurring); id. at 476, 243 P.3d at 539–40
(Madsen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
213. See Benjamin J. McDonnell, Finding a Contract in the “Muddle”: Tracing the Source of
Design Professionals’ Liability in the Construction Context Under Washington’s Independent Duty
Doctrine, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 627, 653 (2012).
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At most, two justices in Affiliated suggested this.214 At the same time,
the author also recognized that Justice Madsen’s concurrence/dissent
strongly opposed using the independent duty doctrine.215 What the
author was missing is that Justice Chambers also disagreed with the lead
opinion’s analysis, and that the lead opinion did not actually reflect the
court’s precedential holding.216
The author of that article is not alone—others are confused as well.
Litigants have had a hard time drawing the line between the broad
reaching dicta within the lead opinion and the holding. For instance, one
litigant cited the lead opinion in Affiliated for the proposition that the
Court “expressly did not overrule any of its prior decisions on the
economic loss doctrine” by adopting the independent duty doctrine.217 It
is true that the two justices signing the lead opinion expressly stated that
they were not overruling any of the Court’s prior cases, but it is also true
that the three justice concurrence/dissent said that applying the
independent duty doctrine did expressly overrule economic loss doctrine
precedent.218 The remaining justices did not contribute to this
argument.219 Effectively, the Court did not speak on the continuing
validity of the economic loss doctrine’s precedent. Thus, this dialogue
between the lead opinion and the concurrence/dissent is arguably dicta.
III. THE SOLUTION: REVISING THE COURT’S APPROACH TO
FRAGMENTED DECISIONS
A.

Remedying Confusion with the Wright Rule

A majority of the Court now subscribes to using the Wright rule,220
but there are still issues that need to be addressed before it can be
workable. Specifically, the Court has not expressed what role dicta plays

214. Compare Affiliated, 170 Wash. 2d at 444, 243 P.3d at 523, 525–26, with id. at 461, 243 P.3d
at 532 (Chambers, J., concurring), and id. at 476, 243 P.3d at 539–40 (Madsen, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
215. McDonnell, supra note 213, at 653.
216. See Affiliated, 170 Wash. 2d at 461, 243 P.3d at 532 (Chambers, J., concurring).
217. Supplemental Brief of Appellant, at *9, Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Engineers, Inc.,
179 Wash. 2d 84, 312 P.3d 620 (2013) (No. 86590-6), 2012 WL 3072102 (citing Affiliated, 170
Wash. 2d at 450 n.3, 243 P.3d at 526 n. 3 (lead opinion)).
218. See Affiliated, 170 Wash. 2d at 450 n.3, 243 P.3d at 526 n.3 (lead opinion); id. at 463–64,
243 P.3d at 533 (Madsen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
219. See id. at 461–63, 243 P.3d at 532–33 (Chambers, J., concurring).
220. See In re Det. of Reyes, 184 Wash. 2d 340, 346, 358 P.3d 394, 379 (2015); supra
section I.A.2.
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in the Wright rule or updated its internal procedures to match the new
rule.
The Wright rule lacks a clear complementary decision by the Court on
what constitutes dicta for the purposes of the rule. Assuming that a
dissent in and of itself is dicta “presumes its conclusion: dissents are said
to be unreliable because they do not generate precedent.”221 But in
applying the Wright rule, dissents do have an effect on the judgment.
This was the case in Colorado Structures, when the Court based the
award of Olympic Steamship fees from a cross-judgment majority.222
This still leaves us to address the contradiction posed by the precedent
formed in Rhone, that “if a separate opinion does not concur in the
judgment, any language expressing how the law should be applied in
future cases . . . is dicta.”223 There is a significant difference between
Justice Sanders’s dissent in Colorado Structures and Justice Madsen’s
concurrence in Rhone. Justice Sanders’s dissent in Colorado Structures
actually applied to the litigants at bar and affected the judgment.224 A
dissent also had an effect on the judgment of the case in El Centro de la
Raza, when a cross-judgment majority held that the superintendent
provision of the charter school act was unconstitutional.225
The line between dicta and statements that hold precedential value
does need not need to be revolutionary: if a cross-judgment majority has
an actual outcome on the case at bar, that reasoning forms precedent.
And this line would be clearer if a “dissenting” opinion that actually
affects the judgment were properly labeled as a “concurrence in part and
dissent in part.” This resolves the conflict between Wright and Rhone
regarding dicta and precedent.226
B.

The Wright Rule Should Factor into Assigning Lead Opinions

The benefits that the Wright rule provides are completely obscured by
the internal procedures that the Court uses to assign opinions. This is
because the court’s voting procedures do not match its stated preferences
and practices for generating precedent.227 While the precedent going
221. Re, supra note 2, at 1990.
222. See supra section I.A.2 (discussing Colorado Structures and Olympic Steamship fee
awards).
223. King Cty. v. Vinci Constr. Grands Projets, 188 Wash. 2d 618, 635, 398 P.3d 1093, 1106
(2017) (Madsen, J., dissenting).
224. See supra notes 89–96 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 147–163 and accompanying text.
226. See supra section I.A.3 (discussing the conflict between the Wright rule and that in Rhone).
227. See Post & Salop, supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing outcome and issue

19 - Clark (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2022

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

1/16/2020 3:45 PM

[Vol. 94:1989

forward focuses on the reasoning supporting each issue,228 the vote to
assign the lead opinion is determined by what the judgment is for each
issue irrespective of the reasoning.229 But the justice who writes the lead
opinion only needs to get the unqualified assent of at least four other
justices on one issue addressed by the court.230 The result is lead
opinions that do not end up garnering even a plurality of the Justices’
assent.231
State v. Schierman is an illustrative example. Using the Wright rule, a
majority of the Court agreed to affirm the lower court’s ruling on both
the guilt and conviction phase issues.232 Justice McCloud’s lead opinion
only agrees in the judgment on one of the issues, and on that issue it
doesn’t even contain a complete picture of the reasoning.233 But the
precedential holding for courts going forward exactly matches Justice
Yu’s concurring opinion in both the reasoning and the judgment on both
issues, which is why lower courts cite to this opinion.234 See Table 6
(Schierman Holdings), reprinted below:

voting); Anglin KCBA Presentation, supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing
Washington’s metavoting procedures); section I.A.2 (discussing Washington’s practices for
generating precedent from fragmented decisions); Re, supra note 2 at 1990 (discussing the weight
of dissenting opinions and its relation to dicta).
228. See supra section I.A.2.
229. See Anglin KCBA Presentation, supra note 118 and accompanying text.
230. INTERNAL PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 13, at II-6; see supra section II.A.2.
231. See State v. Sassen Van Elsloo, 191 Wash. 2d 798, 425 P.3d 807 (2018); State v. Schierman,
192 Wash. 2d 577, 438 P.3d 1063 (2018).
232. See id. at 593, 438 P.3d at 1072 (lead opinion); id. at 747, 438 P.3d at 1145 (Madsen, J.,
concurring); id. at 763–64, 438 P.3d at 1152 (Yu, J., concurring); id. at 749–50, 781, 438 P.3d at
1146, 1161 (Stephens, J., concurring).
233. Id. at 577, 438 P.3d at 1063 (lead opinion) (referring the reader to Justice Yu’s concurring
opinion for discussion of key reasoning contributing to the judgment).
234. See, e.g., State v. Karas, 6 Wash. App. 2d 610, 612–13, 431 P.3d 1006, 1008 (2018).
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Table 6:
Schierman Holdings
Opinion label,
author, and
number of
votes

Did a violation
of Schierman’s
rights warrant
reversal of his
conviction?
No

Was the death
sentence
disproportiona
te?

Outcome

Yes

Concurrence,
Madsen (1)236

No

Yes

Concurrence/D
issent, Yu (3)237

No

No

Concurrence/D
issent, Stephens
(3)238

Yes

No

Dissent,
Fairhurst (1)239

Yes

Yes

Conviction:
Affirm
Sentence:
Remand
Conviction:
Affirm
Sentence:
Remand
Conviction:
Affirm
Sentence:
Remand
Conviction:
Reverse
Sentence:
Affirm
Conviction:
Reverse
Sentence:
Vacate

No: affirm the
conviction
(5–4)

No: affirm the
death sentence
(6–3)

Lead Opinion,
McCloud (1)235

235. Id. at 593, 438 P.3d at 1072.
236. Id. at 747, 438 P.3d at 1145 (Madsen, J., concurring).
237. Id. at 763, 764, 438 P.3d at 1152 (Yu, J., concurring).
238. Id. at 749–50, 781, 438 P.3d at 1146, 1161 (Stephens, J., concurring).
239. Id. at 781, 480 P.3d at 1161 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting).

Uphold the
conviction and
the sentence
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The Court could easily fix this problem by switching its initial vote
from an outcome vote to an issue vote. That would allow the Court to
gauge where the majority of the Court actually stands on each issue and
allows them to better predict who should write the initial lead opinion.
C.

Other Structural and Organizational Tactics Can Bring Clarity to
Decisions

The Washington State Supreme Court should change its internal
procedures to encourage clarity in its opinions. The Court should require
that any written opinion within a fragmented decision be labeled in parts.
The justices would then sign each part of every opinion that they agree
with. The opinion that concurs in the judgment that has the most
signatures would then be classified as the lead opinion. Without
reassigning the lead opinion to the justice that can garner the most
signatures, the pluralities and majorities of the court are obscured—thus
detracting from the Court’s authoritative power.240
This labeling is preferable to encouraging or forcing the justices to
sign on to each other’s opinions. Encouraging disingenuous agreement
provides the public with the illusion of a false consensus on the Court.
As discussed in section I.C above, dissent is an expression of the Court’s
power.241
D.

A Confusing Case Revisited: How it Could Have Been Done
In State v. Schierman, certain changes to the Court’s internal

240. One fragmented decision issued near the time of this Comment’s publication summarizes
how the justices voted on each of the major issues of the case. See Washington v. Muhammad, No.
96090-9, slip op. at 38 (Wash. Nov. 7, 2019) (“Seven members of this court agree that a cell phone
ping constitutes a search under the state and federal constitutions. However, six members of this
court agree that the ping was permissible, thus affirming the Court of Appeals in part. Five members
of the court hold that Muhammad’s first degree rape and felony murder convictions violate double
jeopardy. Therefore, five members of this court reverse the Court of Appeals in part and remand to
trial court for the dismissal of the lesser-included offense and for other proceedings consistent with
our opinions.”). While this is a useful summary of the basic holdings of the case, the Court should
update its rules to provide consistent clarity to the public when issuing fragmented decisions. Clarity
in the lead opinion as to the exact holdings also allows the Clerk of the Supreme Court to made
accurate awards to the parties at the conclusion of the case. See Clerk’s Ruling Regarding Setting of
Att’y Fees & Am. Clerk’s Ruling on Costs at 2, 2 n.2, Colo. Structures, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the W.,
161 Wash. 2d 577, 167 P.3d 1125 (2007) (No. 76973-7) (awarding Olympic Steamship fees, relying
on the conclusion of the lead opinion to accurately state the court’s holding).
241. Perhaps this is what Justice J.M. Johnson alluded to in Ruem. See State v. Ruem, 179 Wash.
2d 195, 220, 313 P.3d 1156, 1170 (2013) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
supra section II.C.
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procedures, like those recommended above, would have provided clarity
to lower courts and the public.242 To clarify precedential effect of
Schierman, the Court should have designated Justice Yu’s opinion as the
lead opinion. To arrive at that decision, the Court would essentially
engage in two rounds of voting before labeling the opinions. After oral
arguments, the justices would engage in an outcome vote243 based on
whether to affirm or reverse on both the guilt and sentencing issues.
First, the justices would engage in an issue vote on the guilt phase issue.
Justices McCloud, Madsen, Yu, González, and Wiggins would form a
majority vote to affirm in the judgment on the guilt issue.244 Next, the
justices would engage in an issue vote on the sentencing phase issues.
The issue vote on the sentencing phase issues would result in six justices
agreeing to affirm Schierman’s death sentence.245 See the outcome of
this first round of voting in Table 7:
Table 7:
Schierman after issue voting
Guilt phase issue246
Majority
(5)
McCloud
Madsen
Yu
González
Wiggins

Nonmajority
(4)
Stephens
Johnson
Owens
Fairhurst

Sentencing phase
issue247
Majority Non(6)
majority
(3)
Yu
McCloud
González Madsen
Wiggins
Fairhurst
Stephens
Johnson
Owens

At this point, the responsibility for writing a lead opinion should be

242. See supra sections III.A–C.
243. See Post & Salop, supra note 51 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 170–171 and accompanying text; supra notes 235–239 and text
accompanying tbl.6.
245. See supra notes 172–174; supra notes 235–239 and text accompanying tbl.6.
246. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text; supra notes 235–239 and text accompanying
tbl.6.
247. See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text; supra notes 235–239 and text accompanying
tbl.6.
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assigned to one of the justices who is in the majority for both issues.248
The candidates for writing the lead opinion in this case would be Justices
Yu, González, or Wiggins. Say that Justice Yu receives the duty of
writing the opinion and circulates her opinion to the other justices. When
Justice Yu fails to receive a majority of the justices’ signatures, the
Court would move towards a second round of voting in anticipation that
it will be issuing a fragmented decision. Justices McCloud, Madsen,
Stephens, and Fairhurst would likely break off to write their own
opinions. Justice Yu would then label the parts of her opinion, as would
the justices breaking off to write concurrences and dissents.
The second vote would not be a formal vote but would occur by the
justices signing on to the parts of the circulating opinions that they agree
with. After all the justices are done signing on to the parts of the
opinions they agree with—and possibly switching sides a few times—
the Court would determine which opinion that agreed with the
issue voting.
Next, the Chief Justice would then assign the opinion to the justice
that was in the majority for the vote on the judgment and gained a
plurality of votes in the reasoning. In this case, Justice Yu is the most
appropriate choice for drafting the lead opinion because the majority
agreed with her in the judgment and the rules she promoted garnered the
assent of the most the justices on the guilt-phase issue and the majority
of the justices on the sentencing-phase issue.249 To make the separate
plurality and majority parts of the opinion clear, it would make sense to
include a caption before the lead opinion.
CONCLUSION
The Washington State Supreme Court’s current method for labeling
opinions clashes with its method for piecing together precedent from its
fragmented decisions. The Court’s current methods create confusion
among the public and in lower courts. To alleviate this confusion, the
Court needs to update its administrative procedures to take the reasoning
of its decisions into account when labeling opinions. The Court can
achieve this by engaging in two voting rounds at the close of each case.
First, the justices would vote on whether to affirm or overturn the ruling
248. Or, if there are multiple issues and no justice is in the majority for both issues, the justice
that is in the majority for the most issues. If that fails, the Court could default to the justice that
prepared the pre-hearing report.
249. See supra notes 174–84 and accompanying text; supra notes 235–239 and text
accompanying tbl.6.

19 - Clark (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

PIECING TOGETHER PRECEDENT

1/16/2020 3:45 PM

2027

of the lower court in each discrete issue addressed by the Court. Next,
the Court would circulate opinions that bear labels separating each
distinct line of reasoning. The justices would essentially engage in a
second vote by signing on to each part in every opinion that they agree
with. Then, the final decision of whose opinion bears the lead opinion
label in a fragmented decision would be based on which opinion
concurring with the judgment obtained the most signatures for each issue
addressed. Adopting this policy would increase the strength and
authoritative power of the Court and save future litigants and members
of the public from having to piece together precedent without guidance.

